PROSPECTS FOR RELIEF / DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS IN SPLA-CONTROLLED AREAS OF SOUTHERN SUDAN

A Report to Save The Children Fund (UK)

by John Ryle

May 1989

CONTENTS

1. Summary
2. Itinerary
3. Terms of Reference and Research Objectives
4. The SPLA and the SRRA
5. NGOs and IGOs
6. Possible Areas of Operation
   - The Central Equatoria border zone
   - Torit-Nimule
   - Nasir-Jekau
7. Recommendations
8. Maps and a Table
9. Notes
   - Key to Acronyms
   - Acknowledgements and contact numbers
   - Bibliography
10. Appendices
    - Sobat Basin Integrated Rural Development Project Proposal by James Duku, SRRA
    - 'The Anuak Tragic Situation' by James Duku (August 1988)
    - Extract from 'The Plight of the Sudanese People' by James Duku including weight/height survey from Nasir district (June 1988)
    - Situation Report on Abwong for ICRC by F. Grima and T. Loefsdot
    - Note of Meeting with James Duku, by Jim Haund
    - Special Appeal for ICRC S. Sudan Programme (April 1989)
    - SRRA Sec-General's Report by Dr. Richard Mulla (April 1989)
1. SUMMARY

The SPLA are now the de facto rulers of large parts of Southern Sudan, but the situation there is still unstable. Food has become an important weapon in the civil war. Because the SPLA control access to the rural areas the current relief effort has so far favoured them. Thanks to continuing operations by ICRC and Unicef/WFP famine has been averted - or at least postponed - in Bahr-al- Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria. But in parts of Upper Nile the situation is still serious. All relief operations are liable to be curtailed by the rains and, in the case of that organized by the UN, by the expiry of their agreement with the Khartoum government and the SPLA.

A number of NGOs have recently started projects in SPLA-controlled areas, predominantly in the health field. They will face problems in the coming months due to the rains and the probable termination of the UN emergency programme, which has provided logistical and material support.

During the rains, from now until November, when food delivery to SPLA areas becomes difficult, the SPLA are liable to subordinate the relief effort to military considerations.

SPLA hegemony has permitted the reestablishment of normal agricultural activity in some areas of the south. Despite the lack, in most places, of inputs of seeds and tools, but because of the loss of last year's crop, from floods or military activity, the normal seasonal hardship of the mid-year hunger gap is likely to be exacerbated, except in those areas where ICRC or WFP have been able to stockpile food.

The biggest emergency in the south will continue to be Juba, where a large population is completely dependent on relief supplies. There may be an SPLA onslaught on Juba at any time. In such an event, although the relief operation could continue under SPLA auspices, some of the inhabitants of the town are likely to flee - either into SPLA controlled areas - if there is food there - or towards the government-controlled zone in the West or southwards to Uganda. An SPLA blockade of relief supplies would have a similar effect.

A crucial issue for agencies operating in SPLA areas is the expanding role of the SRRA, the SPLA's relief wing. The SRRA aspires to be an implementing agency, an indigenous NGO; it also acts as a department of SPLA civilian administration, subordinate to the military command. Whatever happens - whether the SPLA wins an outright victory in the south or makes a peace agreement with the Khartoum government, or whether there is a stalemate - the SRRA seems likely to play the central role in dealings with relief and development agencies. If SCF wishes to assist the Southern Sudanese population it must pursue a realistic policy of cooperation with the SRRA, starting without delay.
## ITINERARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27/8 Feb</td>
<td>Flight to Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March</td>
<td>&quot; Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 March</td>
<td>&quot; Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March</td>
<td>Truck to Busia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 March</td>
<td>&quot; Kampala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 March</td>
<td>Car to Lira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March</td>
<td>&quot; Kitgum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 March</td>
<td>&quot; Palabek, return to Kitgum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 March</td>
<td>&quot; Kampala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 March</td>
<td>Flight to Arua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March</td>
<td>Car to Kaya, return to Arua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 March</td>
<td>&quot; Moyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 March</td>
<td>Car to Metu, Adjumani and Arinyapi, return to Moyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 March</td>
<td>Flight to Kampala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April</td>
<td>Flight to Arua, car to Moyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 April</td>
<td>Bicycle to border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 April</td>
<td>Car to Arua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April</td>
<td>&quot; Moyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 April</td>
<td>&quot; Arua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 April</td>
<td>Flight to Kampala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 April</td>
<td>Flight to Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 April</td>
<td>Flight to Lokichoggio, flight to Torit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 April</td>
<td>Flight via Kapoeta to Lokichoggio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 April</td>
<td>Flight via Lodwar to Nairobi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. TERMS OF REFERENCE & RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The original terms of reference for this report envisaged a broad review of the social and health conditions of the population of SPLA-held areas of South Sudan and an assessment of the possibilities for SCF assistance there. At the time of commissioning the report (in February 1989), very few NGOs were working in SPLA areas, either because, like SCF, they had operations in the Northern Sudan which they did not wish to jeopardise or because they did not have confidence in the capacity of the SRRA to carry out – or cooperate in – relief work (nor, perhaps, that of the SPLA to guarantee security in the areas under their sway). Only one agency, ICRC, had an agreement with both sides in the civil war, permitting it to work openly in both in government-controlled and SPLA-held areas.

In April 1989, however, the UN concluded an agreement for a relief operation in the South, Lifeline Sudan, that opened the door for agencies wishing to operate under UN auspices. Since then there has been a rush to establish projects while the UN agreement with the SPLA and GOS still holds – and before the rains set in. The last two months have also seen a continuing advance by SPLA forces on the East Bank, so that the SPLA can now be said to be the de facto government there.

In view of the urgency of the situation I tried during the course of my trip to identify specific projects for possible SCF involvement at the same time as eliciting information about conditions in SPLA-held areas from SRRA and SPLA representatives and personnel of the few NGOs with recent field experience in those areas.

SCF (UK) has offices in Sudan itself and in three of the countries that border the Southern Region – Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. It is therefore in a good logistical position to assist in SPLA-held areas. Given the political difficulties surrounding cross-border operations I have tried to identify possibilities for assistance in Sudan which could be administered from more than one of these countries.

Dealing with the SRRA proved slow and difficult; it has been in a state of upheaval due to the dismissal in April of the Secretary-General, Dr Richard Mulla, and the sudden expansion of its operations after Lifeline Sudan got under way. I was able, however, while in Ethiopia, to elicit a project proposal for Nasir and Jekau from Mr James Duku, then the SRRA's representative in Addis Ababa, now the officer responsible for External Contacts and Relations in Nairobi. (This is attached.)
At the time of my visit a number of organizations in Addis Ababa had plans to mount a cross-border relief operation into Upper Nile and it was hoped that the Nasir-Jekau area would also be accessible from Ethiopia. It now seems unlikely that the Ethiopian government will permit such activity if expatriates are involved, but the SRRA maintains that it is able to implement cross-border operations semi-officially. In discussions with SRRA personnel I provisionally identified two other possibilities for SCF assistance, first in Torit, which fell to the SPLA at the end of February and secondly on the border with Uganda, in Central Equatoria. (SCF has a large-scale health project in West Nile Province, on the Uganda side.)

At this point in my trip I was requested by SCF to visit Uganda, where UNHCR were sounding the alarm over refugees from Sudan in the northern provinces. After assessing the refugee situation with SCF's Uganda Field Director, I took the opportunity to make contact with the SPLA in Kajo Kaji district, west of the Nile, where they have been have established an administration, based in the border town, Jalisco. Following an invitation to SCF from WFP I then went to Torit, in eastern Equatoria, for two days. En route I visited the UN camp at Lokichokio. Since my return to Nairobi I have been occupied in liaison with Unicef and WFP and the new SRRA team.

4. THE SPLA AND THE SRRA

The military situation in Southern Sudan has changed considerably in recent months, to the extent that for the most part the SPLA is now the power in the land, controlling garrison towns as well as rural areas. It is no longer a guerilla war. The SPLA has tanks and armoured cars and moves by road. With the exception of Malakal the SPLA now controls the entire East Bank of the Nile. On the West Bank, in Bahr-el-Ghazal, the government holds Aweil and Wau, which (like Malakal) have large civilian populations, but the SPLA is present in the surrounding countryside. There are government garrisons in Tonj, Gogrial and Ruhek, but it seems that there are few civilians remaining in these towns. The SPLA hold Yirol and many small administrative centres; only the far west of Bahr-el-Ghazal, around Raga, remains outside their influence. In Central Equatoria (ie on the West Bank east of Maridi) the government holds Juba and Yeit, where there are large garrisons and civilian populations, and a number of beleaguered smaller posts, including Kajo Kaji. The only province in S Sudan where government forces control both the towns and the rural areas is Western Equatoria, including the garrison towns of Maridi, Yambio and Taubur.
The SPLA's reputation in Eastern and Central Equatoria, formerly marred by ill-discipline and violence against civilians, is improving.

The establishment of SPLA rule is too recent for it to be easily characterized. Administration of the civilian population in each district is the responsibility of a Civilian Administrator, who is a military officer under the authority of the local SPLA commander. In some areas there are committees that advise the administrator. It seems that either he or the commander fulfills the role of court president (the point where government and tribal authority meet). SPLA rule is, by most accounts, fundamentally autocratic. Military considerations are paramount.

The SRRA is the relief wing of the SPLA. It is the only indigenous organization permitted to operate in SPLA-controlled areas and international NGOs operating in those areas are required to work under its auspices. There are SRRA offices in London, Nairobi and Kapoeta and representatives in Addis Ababa and in most of the SPLA-controlled towns in southern Sudan, including all those where international NGOs are present. The SRRA is under the de facto control of the SPLA High Command. In theory its officials are appointed by a Refugee Committee in Ethiopia, but on more than one occasion the Secretary-General has been summarily removed on orders from the SPLA leadership. This occurred most recently in April, when Dr Richard Mulla, who had run the organization since July 1988, was replaced by Mr Pierre Okeruk. Since then, apparently in response to the influx of relief under Operation Lifeline, the SRRA has been reorganized under a 15-man management committee. This includes the Secretary-General and members with sectoral responsibility for Health, Agriculture, Water Projects and Food Relief and so on. Most of these individuals are based in Kapoeta, which is awkward. The SRRA is expanding very rapidly in response to the recent influx of relief; few of its officials have any experience of relief work; some held junior government posts before the war, others, like the new Secretary-General, are recent graduates who have been in the SPLA/M for some years.

The administrative costs of the SRRA in Nairobi have been met for a year or more by the NPA. They have recently been supplemented by a US$ 20,000 grant from a Danish Church organization. No doubt the SRRA would welcome further contributions to their administrative overheads. The previous Secretary-General was receptive to the idea of expatriate technical assistance in his office; but under the new regime this is out of the question.

In the past, most NGOs have found dealings with the SRRA to be tricky. These difficulties have reflected internal problems in the SRRA and problems in the relation between it and the SPLA/M. A fair summary of these is contained in the out-going Secretary-General's Report for July 1988-April 1989, which is attached. It would seem that
one of the principal reasons for the removal of Dr Mulla as Secretary-General was his accommodating attitude to NGOs. The recent re-organization and expansion of the higher echelons of the SRRA give the appearance of a move towards professionalization. But, more importantly, they represent a reassertion of SPLA control over SRRA operations and a tighter rein on foreign NGOs. This is both good and bad. Good because SRRA officials now speak with more authority and liaise more closely with the SPLA, which ultimately controls their actions. Bad because their self-assertiveness involves an unrealistic assessment on their part of their technical competence in relief operations.

Should the SRRA be considered as an NGO? Or is better seen as an embryo department of the emerging SPLA civil administration? The kernel of a Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, perhaps? Can it be compared with REST or the ERA? These questions are currently open. It certainly lacks the base that REST has in local committees but there may be more changes in the coming months.

5. NGOs AND IGOs

The most effective relief programme in Sudan has undoubtedly been that of the ICRC. Their efforts in SPLA areas have been concentrated on Bahr-el-Ghazal and western Upper Nile, beginning with cattle vaccination and continuing with food relief, agricultural inputs and an EPI programme. (The ICRC's most recent resumé of their programme is attached.) The ICRC agreement with GOS and the SPLA involves exact parity between the two sides. They have air access only and they are precluded from working together with other agencies (though Unicef supplies the equipment for their EPI programme). According to the ICRC delegate in Nairobi their relations with SPLA personnel in the field have generally been good. He says their problems have generally been in dealing with the higher levels of the organization.

Operation Lifeline Sudan is a short-term UN food and relief commodity delivery programme (with Unicef as the lead agency and WFP as the other main participant). The aim is to deliver relief items to vulnerable areas of the South before the rains set in. The proposed UN agreement with the government of Sudan provided for a "month of tranquillity"; this was modified in discussions with SPLA officials to a number of "corridors of peace" into the South from Northern Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. The agreement came into effect in April and will last, according to the SPLA, until the end of May. It has not prevented attacks on convoys in SPLA territory. The UN operation complements the ICRC programme in the sense that - on the SPLA side -
it is mainly directed at Eastern Equatoria and Upper Nile.

Unlike the ICRC, Unicef and WFP have actively solicited the participation of international NGOs, including SCF. Under the UN umbrella, and with logistical and material support from the UN, a number of these NGOs have already initiated projects in SPLA-controlled areas (see table). Most of these projects require an involvement that will extend well beyond the period of tranquillity and the termination of the UN/GOS/SPLA agreement. SRRA officials anticipate that participating NGOs will make independent agreements with them after the withdrawal of the UN, but the absence of UN logistical support will certainly cause difficulties. It is not clear whether the UN will continue material support of projects initiated under the current agreement after Operation Lifeline is terminated.

A dozen or more NGOs are now engaged in small-scale projects in Southern Sudan, some on both sides. But many are barely operational. Neither Unicef nor the SRRA have a complete list available. The table in this report is by no means authoritative, but it is the most complete so far. Many of the projects involve wishful thinking on the part of agencies. Some of the NGOs are currently involved in disputes with the SRRA for this reason.

6. POSSIBLE AREAS OF OPERATION

There is a tendency in relief discourse about the southern Sudan to regard it as an undifferentiated zone, uniformly affected by war and dearth, but there are important differences between the agro-pastoral mode of livelihood prevalent in Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile and the agricultural economy of most of Equatoria. These areas have also had different experiences of development in the past and they will be differently affected by current R & D inputs. Their experience of the war differs and so, consequently, does the level of support for the SPLA.

The relief Klondike developing in Eastern Equatoria, for instance, because of its accessibility from Kenya, is liable to distort the local economy quite dramatically, since Kapoeta district has hitherto been one of the least developed areas of the entire Sudan. There is certainly no case for SCF entering this area.

Despite the size of the combined relief operation in S Sudan there seems to have been no attempt to construct a comparative map of need, to identify the areas that require assistance most. The population figures provided by the SRRA and ostensibly accepted by the UN agencies are clearly not based on proper surveys and have certainly
been inflated to suit the strategic considerations of the SPLA.

The most neglected area in the current relief effort would appear to be northern Upper Nile. For this, among other reasons, I favour serious consideration of the SRRA project in Nasir-Jekau considered below. This is a very remote area and the need there is likely to be correspondingly great.

The border area between Central Equatoria and Uganda is another area that has been neglected in the UN relief effort. The immediate need there is not so great, but SCF is in a position to help forestall a drift of refugees from there into Uganda.

Torit is a less suitable candidate for SCF assistance. Its emergency relief needs have been well served by WFP and NCA propose to resume work in health and supplementary feeding. I include some notes on Torit mainly because the social and political conditions there may be pointers towards those prevailing in other SPLA-controlled towns. Since I was discouraged by SRRA officials from visiting Nasir, at least at this stage, I am unable to say from personal observation what things are like there.

Central Equatoria Border Zone with Uganda

The area north of the Uganda border in Central Equatoria has been under SPLA influence for some time, although there are still government garrisons in Kajo Kaji and on the Kaya-Yei road. The local people, the Kuku, are famously enterprising, and the area was one of the most developed in the Southern Sudan. Some Kuku have taken refuge in Uganda from the exactions of the SPLA. There is a lot of movement back and forth over the border. It is an area where a small aid input could have a significant stabilizing effect.

Kajo Kaji district is easily accessible from West Nile, where SCF already have a project but it is doubtful whether SCF could be directly instrumental in relief because the Ugandan authorities do not officially countenance cross-border operations except under UN auspices through Nimule, which is on the other side of the Nile. (At the local level the NRA have very good relations with the SPLA.) The SCF Field Director in Kampala is currently engaged in discussions with WFP on a possible extension of their agreed routes to the Moyo-Kajo Kaji road. It would be perfectly possible to hand over relief items discreetly to SPLA contacts in Moyo. But any assistance to Kajo Kaji should involve SRRA as the implementing agency; otherwise there is a risk of souring relationships with them, as well as with the Ugandan government.

Kajo Kaji is a cul de sac. Poor roads link it to Juba and
Yei, but the road from Juba might become a route for refugees in the event of a blockade. If the SPLA take Juba, or advance further on the West Bank, there are bound to be some displaced people moving south into Uganda, where they will end up on SCF's lap in West Nile, so it would make sense for SCF to make any preemptive moves it can.

**Torit and Nimule**

Torit is the principal town in East Bank Equatoria. It fell to the SPLA in February after a fifteen month siege. In April SCF were invited by LWF to monitor food distribution in Torit district and to join a convoy from Uganda to Nimule and Torit. In the event this invitation was not accepted, but I visited Torit under UN auspices at the end of April, travelling in the company of the Nairobi representative of NCA and two of his colleagues. Previously NCA had a large project on the East Bank, based in Torit, which was curtailed by the war. SCF ran an MCH clinic in Torit in the 1970s. This was subsequently taken over by NCA. NCA propose to rehabilitate the hospital in Torit, and the clinic and reestablish a primary health care system and EPI programme in Torit and two other centres, Nimule and Parajok. They were interested in the possibility of SCF providing an expatriate health worker to assist them in this.

Subsequent conversations with SRRA personnel suggest that they are unreceptive to the idea of NGOs from outside working together. I think also that the expansion of NCA’s work to Torit is not a fait accompli. Nimule was a focus of resistance to the SPLA and a large segment of the population, who are Madi by tribe, fled to Uganda when the SPLA took the town earlier this year.

Because of the arrival of the WFP food convoy substantial numbers of people were arriving in Torit when we were there. Since SPLA policy is to recruit all able-bodied men into their ranks, the distinction between fighting men and civilians was hard to maintain. The SRRA claimed a figure of 17,000 for the current civilian population of the town, but their own registration book showed only 3,500. These were meticulously classified by age, sex, tribe and district of origin. I suspect this combination of efficiency and dissimulation may continue to characterise dealings with the SRRA.

**Nasir-Jekau**

Nasir is a garrison town on the Sobat River in Upper Nile close to the Ethiopian border. The SPLA has controlled the rural areas of Nasir district for some years, but the town itself fell only four months ago, after heavy fighting. Nasir itself is a small town, but
the Sabat valley is quite thickly populated, or was. The inhabitants are mainly agro-pastoral Nuer and Anuak. In the past the Sabat valley has been one of the few areas in the south to produce a grain surplus, but it was one of the worst affected by last year’s flood. Fish are an important source of food.

No agency is operating in Nasir. WFP plan to supply the town by river from Malakal, but this will involve taking supplies into a government-controlled town and then out again, something no agency has yet done. And supplies have not yet reached Malakal.

River access to Nasir in the rainy season is possible both from the Nile and down the Baro/Sobat from Ethiopia. The airstrip and the road become unusable in the rainy season.

The SRRA project proposal (appended) is an ambitious 3-year rural development scheme, rather sketchily presented. It is based on a survey conducted by Mr James Duku (also appended). The proposal would clearly benefit from a more extensive survey of the district, but Mr Duku was resistant to suggestions that such a survey was necessary. Perhaps in the circumstances he is right to insist that immediate implementation of some of the components of the project is a priority. (Attached to the present report is an ICRC sitrep for Abwong, a town downriver from Nasir where conditions are probably comparable.) Mr Duku already has funding for the seeds in the agricultural component of his project, though he would not tell me, who from. I therefore suggested that SCF might be willing to provide for the rest of the agricultural input for the first year of the project, ie the hoes, and perhaps also the fishing nets. He welcomed this idea. The hoes are available in Addis Ababa. He says that transport of the material from Addis Ababa will present no problem.

The hoes are very expensive (US$10 per hoe) and there is no provision for transport costs. These are points that should be discussed if SCF decides to fund this project. In the case of the fishing nets, the proposal incorporates a suggestion that nylon line rather than finished nets should be supplied. This is a better idea and would of course be cheaper, but no costing is offered for this alternative. I asked Mr Duku about weights for the nets, as fishermen in the Sudan tend to use scavenged lead or iron, which is likely to be in short supply, rather than stones (which are hard to find on the flood plain and hard to attach to synthetic line). He said he would have to consider supplying material for weights from Ethiopia also. This, of course, would add considerably to the material and transport costs.

Another component of the project that may interest SCF is the provision of educational materials, for which a detailed list has been supplied. The educational section also proposes a building programme and payments for teachers. Mr Duku informs me that the SRRA
policy on remuneration of project staff is that incentives are offered for tasks performed. Staff do not have salaries as such. He also said that the SRRA would reserve the right to pool the money and distribute it distribute differently from the specifications of the project proposal. I am afraid I did not quite follow his drift, but personnel monitoring such a project should be aware of a possible auditing difficulty.

One problem is that hitherto NGOs working with SRRA staff in the field have given them material incentives - clothes, shoes, food. The new SRRA bosses may consider this demeaning. Nevertheless, since there is no cash economy in most parts of the South material incentives make more sense.

The health component of the proposal is clearly important. I am not competent to assess it, but I suppose it could not be implemented properly without considerable professional help. There is apparently a doctor, Dr Akec, working in the Nasir area (it will be noted that he is also mentioned in the ICRC Abwong sitrep appended to this report). Mr Duku is confident of Dr Akec's ability to supervise the health programme. I suggested that a meeting with Dr Akec (or Akech) might be arranged in Addis Ababa, or Nasir itself, and Mr Duku was agreeable, but I suspect that implementation of this phase of the project will have to wait until SRRA realise that they need some expatriate technical assistance and cannot go it alone.

As far as I know this is the first project of such a scale in which the SRRA would be the implementing agency. Funding it would be a gamble, but no more than funding an established NGO to do the same thing. At least the SRRA should have no problems with the SPLA. Across are trying to implement something similar to this in Pibor, but they are currently experiencing operational difficulties. Oxfam funded a small-scale SRRA-implemented seeds and hoes project in Pochalla last year, also under Mr Duku's administration, which was considered a success by both parties.

A special problem may be the proximity of the refugee camps in Ethiopia. Jekau is just down river from the biggest, Itang. Itang is said to have 200,000 inhabitants. It is hard to discover how much movement there is across the border, but it would presumably increase if there was a development programme of any size on the Sudan side. The refugee camps are a source of skilled manpower for the SRRA, which is active there. I think it is probably safe to say that there is solid support for the SPLA in the Nasir area.
The need for assistance in S Sudan in all areas of human welfare is very great and will continue to be. Most of the region is without services of any kind. Recent large-scale emergency relief programmes have alleviated the need for food. So SCF policy in SPLA areas, assuming a long-term interest in helping the people of the region, may reasonably give priority to helping develop the embryonic indigenous institutions whose role is to deliver services to the civilian population. Specifically this will involve developing a working relationship with the SRRA, the sole indigenous relief organization.

More prosaically, SCF's options at present are, in fact, few. The new stance of the SRRA vis a vis NGOs suggests that, as far as new projects are concerned the SPLA is really only interested in those that are to be implemented by the SRRA, backed and monitored by donor organizations. They will tolerate existing projects with expatriate staff, but the working conditions for these staff are such that it would be difficult to recommend involvement of this kind, even if it were called for. The SRRA does not welcome offers of expatriate technical assistance for their Nairobi office. There is no call for SCF to fund any other organization; at the moment the UN, USAID or religious organizations will provide funding for almost any foreign NGO with a project in S Sudan. The SRRA has become suspicious of agencies that devise projects in order to pick up such funding.

Despite the vagaries of the SRRA, the one NGO-backed project implemented by them and properly documented (the Oxfam-Pochala project) was accounted a success by both parties. It would seem that the best chance of establishing a future relationship with the SRRA would seem to be to engage in a similar project on a rather larger scale. This will test their implementing capacity and may open the way to an expanded role for SCF in the future.

The Nasir-Jekau proposal, or parts of it, represents an opportunity to back an SRRA-implemented project which has a reasonable chance of success. SCF should act as soon as possible to confirm their interest in this project.

Unicef should by now have some kind of sitrep available for Nasir and some idea of what they are planning to do there in the coming weeks. The success of the SRRA project may depend on the simultaneous provision of short term food relief in the area, so clearly liaison with Unicef officials must be maintained. It may also be worth contacting LWF, who had a project in Nasir before the war. (And it may be worth asking why LWF, who were expelled from Northern Sudan last year, have not started projects in SPLA areas, unlike other organizations with the same experience (World Vision, Across).)
In the immediate future, ie the next few weeks, if the Nasir project is to be pursued, it is vital to maintain contact with the SRRA. For the time being this means James Duku. His role in the organization is now effectively that of liaison officer and he is based in Nairobi. At our last meeting I asked him if he would still be responsible for the Nasir-Jekau project; he suggested that this responsibility would be shared between him and the new SRRA representative in Addis Ababa, as yet unnamed. If SCF are agreeable to the recommendation of the present report, the Field Director in Addis or the Regional Adviser in Nairobi should move immediately to make an agreement with SRRA through Mr Duku for the partial financing of the Nasir-Jekau project. Mr Duku assures me that SRRA are currently drafting a model agreement for such projects, but SCF personnel should perhaps be prepared to do this themselves in case the draft does not materialise. Mr Duku is sensitive to the need for proper accounting, auditing and monitoring procedures. I think he is also proud enough of his project to take an continuing and active interest in its successful implementation, if he is allowed to.

At the same time it would be appropriate to reiterate SCF interest in Central Equatoria and perhaps elicit a further proposal for assistance in the Jalimo-Kajo Kaji area, which is, incidentally, Mr Duku's home district.

Mr Duku stressed the need for discretion with reference to any project implemented from Ethiopia because of SRRA's anomalous legal position there. I told him that discretion would be in SCF's interests too because of its operations in Northern Sudan. The project would have to be monitored from Nairobi.

I would be grateful if the Regional Adviser could speak to Rolf Strand of NCA, with whom I visited Torit, to explain SCF's considerations in the matter of relations with the SRRA and why SCF is unlikely, at present, to put expatriate personnel into SPLA areas, either alone or in cooperation with another agency. I hope it will be possible for Mr Strand to be given a copy of this report, in confidence. It might also be appropriate to make certain sections of it, notably the maps and the table of NGOs, available to others, eg the SRRA, UN etc, as they are generally deficient in such information.

I have, incidentally, on SCF's behalf, given the SRRA a set of 1:250,000 maps of S Sudan, the better for them to plan their operations.
### Table of NGOs and Relief Projects in SPLA and Government controlled areas of S. Sudan

From report to SCF (UK), 'Prospects for Relief Operations in SPLA controlled Areas of Southern Sudan', by John Ryle, May 1989

Sources: Unicef, WFP, ICRC, SRRA and NGOs.

This list is confidential and not for circulation.

Note: Govt-controlled towns in italics (data incomplete for agencies operating from northern Sudan); UN agencies in square brackets; oblique stroke between agencies signifies that first named is implementing agency.

- Not yet operational (end April 1989)
- Not under UN auspices

|----------|--------|--------|---------|-------|--------|------|---------|-------|-------|-----|------|

**EAST BANK: EASTERN EQUATORIA (East Bank only) and UPPER NILE (inc. Jonglei)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narus</th>
<th>AMI</th>
<th>AMI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kapoeta</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>WVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? Aref</td>
<td>[WFP]</td>
<td>? Medic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chukudua</td>
<td>Oxfam (US)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maici</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torit</td>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>NCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>NCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talanga</td>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>NCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafon</td>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>NCA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Ikotos
- Kasangor
- Boma
  - MSF-F
  - MSF-F
  - MSF-F
  - IDSS
  - Across
- Pochala
  - MSF-F
  - MSF-F
  - MSF-F
  - SRRRA/SCF-UK
  - IDSS
  - Across
- Boma
  - MSF-H
  - MSF-H
  - MSF-H
  - Across
  - IDSS
  - Across
- Akobo
- Nasir
  - MSF-H
  - MSF-H
  - MSF-H
  - ?SRRA/SCF-UK

- Abwong?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAHR-EL-GHAZAL (including Lakes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yirol</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shambe</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bentiu</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td>ICRC+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUATORIA: CENTRAL (West Bank) and WESTERN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>Amref</td>
<td>Amref</td>
<td>ICRC+LWF</td>
<td>Amref</td>
<td>Accord</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Feeding</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Agric.</td>
<td>Vet.</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>Educ.</td>
<td>Comm. &amp; Fish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajo-Kajil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalimo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terakeka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accomplish/ Oxfam(UK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tali Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accomplish/ Oxfam(UK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mundri</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amadi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naridi</td>
<td>MSF-F</td>
<td>MSF-F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasbiro</td>
<td>GED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MSF-F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nzara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambura</td>
<td>MSF-F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. NOTES

Glossary of Acronyms

(from Report to SCF (UK), 'Prospects for Relief Operations in SPLA controlled Areas of Southern Sudan', by John Ryle, May 1999)

Accomplish Action Committee for Mandari People's (?) Self-Help
Accord Agency for Cooperation in Rural Development
Across Association of Christian Resource Organizations Serving Sudan
AMI Aide Medicale Internationale
Amref African Medical and Research Foundation
CAA Community Aid Abroad
CRS Catholic Relief Services
CWS Church World Service
GED German Emergency Doctors
GOS Government of Sudan
EEC European Economic Community
EGS Episcopal Church of Sudan
ERD
IRC International Rescue Committee
LWF Lutheran World Federation
LWR Lutheran World Relief
Medic (French medical relief agency, splinter from MSF-F)
MSF-B Medecins Sans Frontieres - Belgium
MSF-F Medecins Sans Frontieres - France
MSF-H Medecins Sans Frontieres - Holland
NCA Norwegian Church Aid
NCCK National Council of Churches of Kenya
NPA Norwegian People's Aid
SCC Sudan Council of Churches
SPLA/M Sudan People's Liberation Army / Movement
SRRA Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association
SFN Swedish Free Mission
Sudanaid (Sudanese Catholic relief / development agency)
Unicef United Nations Children's Fund
WVI World Vision International
WFP World Food Programme
Acknowledgments & Contact Numbers
[from Report to SCF (UK) 'Prospects for R & D Operations in SPLA controlled Areas of Southern Sudan' by John Ryle, May 1989]

The author would like to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of the individuals and institutions named below. None of the following should be taken as endorsing the conclusions of this report, nor are they responsible for any errors.

UK: London

Stephen Madut Bak SPLA
Richard Biang SRRA

Northern Sudan: Khartoum

John Patel Field Director, SCF
Kwaja Yai Kuol SCF
Arop Madut SCC
Joseph Lino Wuor
Dr Benaiah Yongo Bure Institute of Afro-Asian Studies
Frances Guy Political Officer, British Embassy

Ethiopia: Addis Ababa

Jim Maund Field Director, SCF 514044 res 551464
Dr Mahendra Sheth SCF

Dr Lam Akol SPLA High Command 153736
Nhial Deng Nhial SPLA
James Duku SRRA representative

res (Vila Verde Hotel) 653299
[currently posted to SRRA office, Nairobi]

Paavo Faern LWF 553288 / 553289
Callum Maclean: ActionAid (formerly Field Officer, Oxfam)
Robert Frasure: Aid Counsellor, US Embassy
Rev Jack Finucane: Concern
Dr Gus O'Keefe: CRDA Coordinator
Pat Johns: CRS
Johnny Thorsen: NCA
Gote Lidvall: Regional Emergency Aid Co-ordinator, Swedish Embassy
Nick Winer: Country Representative, Oxfam

Ben Foot: Regional Adviser, SCF (UK)
Sally Foot: SCF
Dr Tony Nash: SCF
Martina Bazagaga: SCF
Solomon: ---
Elijah: ---
Vincent O'Reilly: Co-ordinator/Chief of Operations, Lifeline Sudan (Unicef)
Detlef Palm: Project Officer (NGOs)
Rolf Bohlin: Logistics Officer, Lifeline
Nila Enquist: WFP / Lifeline Sudan

Dr Richard K. Mulla: former Secretary-General, SRRA
Pierre Okeruk: Secretary-General, SRRA (from end April)
Gabriel Alak: Project Officer, SRRA (from end April)
Daniel Deng: Accountant, SRRA (from end April)

(SRRA officials may stay at the Sec-Gen's house - Tel 504875. Dr Lam Akol is currently at the Pan-Afric Hotel, room 101, Tel 7208221)

Anthony Ratter: ERDA (former consultant to SRRA)
Leif Zetterlund: Swedish Free Mission

Kenya: Nairobi

Dr Richard K. Mulla: former Secretary-General, SRRA (now posted to Kapoeta)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Notes</th>
<th>Contact Info</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Koepp</td>
<td>LWF</td>
<td>500950 / 501634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolf Strand</td>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>500546 / 501686 / 501689 res 60630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominique Buff</td>
<td>Head of Delegation, ICRC</td>
<td>723963/4/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaac Cuir Riak</td>
<td>Research Fellow</td>
<td>22036/334244 x2451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo Ballard</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>res 62986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Akol</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Kelly</td>
<td>Executive Director, Across</td>
<td>20693 / 20655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>339388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koert Lindyer</td>
<td></td>
<td>891179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Winter</td>
<td>BP Solar</td>
<td>22697 / 338113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>res 0150 20268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egil Hagen</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>582484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veronica Forwood</td>
<td>Agence France Presse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clement Mbora</td>
<td>Box 26263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Green</td>
<td>Oxfam, S. Sudan Liaison</td>
<td>47025 / 47166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ted Gallaher</td>
<td>Oxfam (Juba)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iris ---</td>
<td>Pilot, Safari Air</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heather ---</td>
<td>Pilot, Safari Air</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Davies</td>
<td>IDSS</td>
<td>721086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johan Heslink</td>
<td>MSF-H</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Christophe Adrian</td>
<td>MSF-F Country Representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lokichokio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond ---</td>
<td>Unicef</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Eunice</td>
<td>Unicef</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title/Role</td>
<td>Phone Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Cavell</td>
<td>Field Director, SCF</td>
<td>258815 res 233057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Cavell</td>
<td>British High Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yves Trabac</td>
<td>MSF-France</td>
<td>265521 / 267881 res 260244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Hildegaard Thiesboumei</td>
<td>GED</td>
<td>267226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Farrell</td>
<td>Country Representative, WFP</td>
<td>255226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holbrook Arthur</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goran Olfaar</td>
<td>WFP Lifeline Sudan</td>
<td>230193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gote Herz</td>
<td>WFP Lifeline Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Macray</td>
<td>WFP Lifeline Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christoph Hamm</td>
<td>(Yambio) c/o MSF-France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel</td>
<td>Driver, SCF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Stockton</td>
<td>Country Representative, Oxfam</td>
<td>233813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine Bond</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kitgum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Broughton</td>
<td>Oxfam (currently CARE, Australia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cathy Mears</td>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Apila</td>
<td>District Administrator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Ciantia</td>
<td>District Medical Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Duke Lokojo</td>
<td>ex-NCA, Parajok</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Ochan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Onguti</td>
<td>Chairman, Refugee Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jill Mein</td>
<td>SCF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Jan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td>SCF driver</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Martin</td>
<td>Field Director, LWF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Thorne</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ali Kaunda Voni—— Field Assistant, UNHCR

Francis Apiko
Jan Paulson

Paul Kakonge
Isaac Vuciri
Mr Ambako

Christopher Taban

Francis Apiko
Office Administrator, LWF

Jan Paulson
LWF

Paul Kakonge
District Administrator

Isaac Vuciri
District Executive Officer

Mr Ambako
Internal Security Officer

Christopher Taban

S.Sudan: Jalimo / Kajo Kaji

James Wani Iga
SPLA Zonal Commander, Central and Western Equatoria

Peter Dau Maniok
A/Commander, Jalimo

Khamis Pitiya
Deputy Commander, Jalimo

Kapoeta

Edward Lino
Civilian Administrator SPLA

Acuil Malith
Agricultural officer SRRA

Agailth (?) Awan
Education Officer SRRA

Dr Dau Aleer
Medical Officer SRRA

Mohammed Arum
Research Officer SRRA

Louis Lumuba
Press Officer SRRA (?)

Paul Anadi
Publicity Officer SRRA

Monassa Marie
Water Project Officer SRRA

Dr Sam Tussie
IRC

Torit

A/Commander Bior Ajan (?) Duot
SPLA

A/Commander David Doul Palak
SPLA

Capt. Wilson Deng Kuoirot
SPLA Commander for Torit town

Patrick Athian
Civilian Administrator

Charles Kuot Chatim
SRRA Representative
Kuol Biong  
SRRA / SPLA

Isaac Noul  
Medical Assistant i/c Hospital

Vincent Iboti  
Medical Assistant

Bior Makarious  
Medical Assistant

Ben Martinson  
WFP

Olau~ Husby  
NCA

Tor Steinar Rafoss  
NCA

Bibliography (see also attached documents)

Adrian, Jean-Christophe "An Exploratory Road Expedition / Food Delivery Convoy to Pochalla / Pibor in Southern Sudan", MSF-F April 1989


Bonner, Raymond 'A Reporter at Large: Famine' *New Yorker* 13 March 1989


MacAskill, Jane 'A Report Based on Two Surveys done in the Toposa Area / Eastern Equatoria, Southern Sudan' NPA February 1988

"03.03.90 Report for Save The Children Fund (UK) "Prospects for Relief/Development Operations in SPLA controlled areas of Southern Sudan", by John Ryle. Map of S. Sudan based on SF/DQF 1:4,000,000
Report for Save The Children Fund (UK)

"Prospects for relief/development operations in SPLA controlled areas of Southern Sudan", by John Ryle.

Map of Kajo Kaji - Nimule 1:135,000, based on Sudan Survey 1:250,000